Opinion: What now for the UN? A new evaluation prompts critical questions

A new internal United Nations evaluation out last week is remarkably critical of the U.N.’s ability to deliver coherent development support. The evaluation comes at a time when the UN80 Initiative — triggered by a funding collapse, and currently the dominant theme at the U.N. — shines a glaring light on organizational deficits while providing a window of opportunity for drastic reforms. The findings of the evaluation confirm what many observers have assumed — that the U.N. development system’s coordination function is mostly “performative.” This contrasts with U.N. reports that have, based on the U.N.’s own surveys, fostered the narrative that “the direction of travel remains positive on the results of the reforms,” which refers to the U.N. development system reform of 2018. The evaluation, carried out by the U.N. Sustainable Development Group System-Wide Evaluation Office, reviewed how far the U.N. has come in building a “new generation” of country teams since 2019. It had a narrow focus on assessing the programming alignment with cooperation frameworks and the reconfiguration of U.N. country teams. The evaluation did not analyze the normative or convening functions of the U.N. resident coordinator system or the issue of cost-efficiency. While success stories were highlighted, the evaluation attributes them to individual “leadership skills” and a deliberate “stepping outside of the processes intended by the guidance.” Coordination processes not working as intended At the country level, the resident coordinator system, or RC system, serves to align the average of 18 U.N. development entities in every low- and middle-income country to deliver as one. Under this system, the resident coordinator leads the U.N. country team and works to ensure that its work is coherent, effective, and aligned with national priorities. Cooperation frameworks are at the center of this RC system, as the mechanism through which the U.N. and host governments are expected to agree on a small number of key thematic priorities in their partnership at the country level. Many findings of the evaluation speak to the same concern: That coordination processes are “more administrative than substantive.” Problems start with the cooperation frameworks, which, seven years after their reform, “are not delivering a more focused, prioritised, and coherent United Nations development offer at the country level, as intended.” U.N. entities are supposed to derive their individual programs from the cooperation frameworks. But the frameworks’ language is often broad and vague, according to the evaluation, so that “almost any programme could be reasonably judged as aligned.” The next line of defense in the RC system against vagueness has also been deemed ineffective. Annual joint work plans are supposed to provide more detail on how cooperation frameworks are implemented. But they, too, "are often a mere collation (often ex-post) of entity activities rather than coherent and strategic and they rarely drive strategic coordination.” On the flexible configuration of the U.N.’s country presence, whereby host governments and the U.N. are supposed to agree on which U.N. entities, or capacities, are needed in a country to effectively support the implementation of cooperation frameworks, the evaluation flatly notes that these processes have not resulted “in actual changes in country engagement.” That is because, among other factors, decisions are influenced by those entities that have direct interests in being represented. The evaluation points out other deficits that hinder cooperation, such as “a lack of real-time transparency,” reporting for joint annual reports that is marked by “high transaction costs and ‘double reporting’ by all stakeholders involved”, and “confusion” about the United Nations Development Programme’s claim to be a SDG “integrator” and how that relates to RC functions. What should the evaluation lead to? The obvious response would be, and has been in previous reforms, to strengthen the RC system. Yet, in a slightly cynical reading, focusing on coordination can be seen as a distraction from asking tough questions about the performance of U.N. development entities. U.N. entities are less focused on achieving impact than their official communications suggest. And competing for donor funding pulls these entities in different directions, making it nearly impossible for the RC system to unify them. To change this, three structural issues should be discussed in the context of UN80: 1. Switching to an impact-driven model. The evaluation notes the dominance of “short-term and project delivery-based business models” as a hindrance to coordination. This “projectitis” comes with high transaction costs, overstretch, low ownership, and a lack of impact orientation. For the U.N., it may create the illusion of relevance to be “in business” with countless projects (5,270 in the case of UNDP in 2024), even though these activities may have little importance for national development. To correct this, U.N. agencies need to transition to measuring success by achievements, not the number of projects and the resources raised through them. Coordination would become a necessity to achieve better results. Project work should be reduced — others can do this better. Where it still happens, it should be informed by the U.N.’s unique possibilities — its stewardship for norms and standards, its ability to convene, to scan for best practices and advise governments on this basis, across borders. This would provide a more compelling U.N. collective offer to developing countries, one that could be expanded to middle- and even high-income countries. 2. Recentralizing decision-making. The evaluation notes that “the level of decentralization and complexity in the UN development system has made … coherence objectively challenging.” The failure to reconfigure U.N. country teams based on actual demand indicates how vested interests have made parts of the U.N. ungovernable. By recentralizing some decision-making, the U.N. could extricate itself from the vested interests and patronage structures at the country level. Cooperation frameworks could be agreed at a high level between governments and the U.N. in New York. In the spirit of radical simplification, the U.N. could work more through regional programs, offering well-tested solutions. While this increases cost efficiency (one regional program comes with less transaction and evaluation costs than many separate small projects), it could also introduce more discipline in terms of focusing on entities' mandates and missions. 3. Member states need to be doing their part. Any organization will adjust to its political and resource environment, which in the case of the U.N. is defined by how donors (through resources) and host governments (through ownership rights) relate to the U.N. The practice of earmarking contributions to specific projects, or sometimes wider causes, creates the kind of insane competition which makes U.N. entities “responsive, but not responsible” — the effects of which show in the coordination challenges. Member states should tie their hands, and those of the U.N., and restrict resource mobilization at the country level, except for pooled funds under the responsibility of resident coordinators. Instead, funding should be routed through headquarters, where it can also be subjected to an approval process that ensures it serves the mandates and mission of U.N. entities. They could also create a truly independent evaluation function, replacing the not-so-independent evaluation offices in all major U.N. entities. Reforms in these three areas could make for a more efficient, effective, relevant, and trusted U.N. Last year’s Summit of the Future provided a software update for the U.N., clarifying new policy priorities for the U.N. Now, there is an unforeseen and unique opportunity for a much-needed institutional update.