Q&A: Islamic Relief, anti-Semitism, and humanitarian impartiality

In July, the United Kingdom’s largest Muslim charity — Islamic Relief Worldwide — was rocked by revelations that two trustees and one senior executive had posted anti-Semitic comments on social media. All three individuals acknowledged their comments were unacceptable and immediately resigned, but the episode fed a narrative pushed by some governments, think tanks, and online commentators that Islamic Relief has an ulterior political agenda. The same allegations have seen IRW labeled a terrorist organization by Israel and led the U.S. Department of State to cut ties in the last days of former President Donald Trump’s administration. In response to the events last summer, Islamic Relief Worldwide appointed an independent commission, led by former U.K. Attorney General Dominic Grieve, to review its internal policies and governance. Grieve spoke to Devex about what he found at IRW and how international humanitarian organizations must hold their employees and affiliates accountable to embodying the values that allow them to operate with impartiality in some of the world’s most difficult places. This conversation has been edited for length and clarity. What was the most critical failing that you uncovered in your inquiry into Islamic Relief Worldwide? The evidence available suggests that Islamic Relief Worldwide is a very well-managed charity by its staff. It's seen as being a key partner within the [Disasters Emergency Committee]. … FCDO [the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office] and its predecessor DFID [the Department for International Development] used it as a trusted partner for delivering aid, particularly in places of difficulty. And its partner organizations have also been seen to have the same credibility. Whilst I'm conscious of the fact that there has been criticism of IRW, including in some blog posts and think tanks — allegations that IRW has a political agenda, which it is seeking in some way to further by using charitable money for what would be a grossly improper purpose — the opinion of IRW's bankers, the opinion of IRW's chartered accountants, and the opinion hitherto of governments is that this is not the case. The problem IRW has had is that on a number of occasions, there have been murmurings, which appear to have some credibility, that individuals associated with IRW have views ... which are expressed in a way which suggests, for example, a willingness to support organizations that might resort to violence. Even if that might be thought by some people to be justified, [it] is absolutely outside the scope of the charitable purposes of IRW. So it constitutes a serious reputational risk to its ability to do its humanitarian work. And because it constitutes such a risk, it's inevitable that any government that wishes to use IRW as a partner to carry out such work is going to be very hesitant about doing so because it's likely to come in for public criticism — even if, in fact, the moneys that are ... being given are being used 100% properly to deliver humanitarian aid. So it's an issue that IRW cannot ignore. And whilst IRW might be able to continue as a charity because it still fulfills its charitable purposes, its ability to be a trusted partner will, I think, be most seriously undermined if it is not seen to have successfully addressed this issue. Your report seems to describe an organization that is in transition in terms of its governance structure and even its identity, in some respects. How would you explain that transition, and how does it relate to some of these questions about what constitutes an effective governance structure and a representative board of directors? This charity was set up by the philanthropy of a single individual: Dr. Hany el-Banna. He, an Egyptian doctor living in Birmingham, [England], thought that this was something that ought to be done, and he wanted to get the Muslim communities in Britain to support. And in order to help him run this charity, he looked to his friends and acquaintances who were primarily drawn from a similar background to him — so they were either doctors, often of an Egyptian Arab background, and other academics or people with scientific qualifications whom he knew through his circle of friends and acquaintances. This charity has now been going for some time. Not only has it turned into a charity with [a] £130 million income globally, of which just under a third comes from the U.K. ... but as it has progressed, they set up branches in other countries, mainly in what we call the Western world, where the money is available, or the Northern world, to transfer that money to places where it's needed. But in the process, the same nexus of acquaintance and friendships is what has driven the development. “Muslim charities are subjected to a level of scrutiny and at times hostility which is, in my view, undeserved.” --— Dominic Grieve, former U.K. attorney general You have to look at that against the size of this charity and the complexity of its work and the fact that the staff it employs — a very substantial number of staff, either in the U.K. but also in other countries — are drawn from a much wider demographic base. And yet with these groups, the people running them have remained very self-contained. Our conclusion was that we felt that when dealing with these reputational issues, there did seem to us to be a risk of a lack of familiarity with the U.K. charity system. Obviously, the staff know all about how it works, but it was noteworthy that the stakeholders would say, “Oh, we know the chief executive, we know the senior staff — all very, very reliable — but we don't actually know these trustees.” This is why I made the recommendation that they should enlarge the board and have five [independent members] and try and identify all those people from accountancy, law, public affairs, government or ex-government individuals who can give them both the advice on governance and reputational risk, which I'm not sure they necessarily had at present. Is your impression that faith-based organizations are particularly susceptible to some of the challenges your commission uncovered? I think it's very difficult to know whether this is an issue. Clearly, the personality and charisma of the founder and the way the charity evolves and gets recognition may be ultimately the more determinant factor than whether it's a faith-based charity or not. The problem IRW has as a faith-based charity — and I have absolutely no doubt about this — is that I'm afraid there is a level of Islamophobia around, and Muslim charities are subjected to a level of scrutiny and at times hostility which is, in my view, undeserved. That's something which, in the current climate, I think a sensible charity just has to say: “Well, that's the way the world is. And we have to make sure, therefore that even if it does appear that there's a sort of bias sometimes against us in our work, but we just show conclusively that we meet the standards.” Then the challenge that Islamic Relief's faith-based identity brings is not a function of its own growth or organization, but it's a function of the scrutiny based in Islamophobic concerns? The difficulties that IRW has had is because a number of individuals associated with it at a trustee or high level have been found to have views which may be influenced by their faith, but they're in fact political viewpoints — not faith-based viewpoints — which are seen as being controversial. Leaving aside whether they're regarded as proper ones or not, [these] are seen as being incompatible with a humanitarian charity. This charity would like to operate in Gaza and the West Bank, and at the moment it can't. Now, on the basis that it is delivering aid properly, the reasons for it not being able to is because the associations or views of some of its trustees have been deemed to be controversial and led to them being banned. They've got to make a choice. I think the key point ... is that this is a humanitarian aid charity which has laid down very clear rules for itself about its impartiality. Now, of course there's a difficult line here. If you're motivated by faith, you may be equally motivated by faith to believe that you should be helping people of all faiths — and none — in their humanitarian need. But you may equally have strong views, based on your faith, that there are many wrongs in the world which need to be righted and that you have a political view about how some of those wrongs should be addressed. And as long as that is within the law of the land, you're not inciting violence or terrorism, or you're not adhering to a proscribed organization, under the laws of the United Kingdom that is [a] perfectly permissible position to have. But I come back to the point: Is that combinable with doing the governance of a faith-based charity which has taken one element of people’s faith and decided to focus on it? And I think faith-based charities are entitled to say, “This is what we are focused on.” … The fact is, it took them into a field of controversy which has an impact on the humanitarian work that's been done. Your report was very focused on Islamic Relief, but how much of what your commission found do you think is generalizable to the broader aid sector? IRW's problem may be specific, but certainly there is quite a lot of evidence of these now very large, internationally focused charities grappling with quite significant governance issues. One of the things I picked up as early stage with IRW is that, far from being an organization with no rules, it's one of the most rules-rich organizations I've ever seen, and this is before I came on the scene. … [Charities] are operating under a deluge of regulatory frameworks and desires to maintain standards which are a long, long way away from anything anybody might have envisaged 60 or 70 years ago. And they're under great scrutiny. The [U.K.] government has a trisector working party because of the real difficulties that charities — not just this charity — have in operating in areas around the world where they're delivering aid, but as the results of delivering aid, they have to talk to or cooperate with political entities, the local structures, and individuals who may be extremely controversial. How do you get aid into Syria? How do you get aid into Yemen? These are some really acute issues, and simply pointing a finger of blame at charities who are trying to do this is wrong.