Did the UN's outgoing Myanmar special envoy fail, or did the system?

In the only meeting they had, in August 2022, the United Nations secretary-general’s special envoy on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, pushed Min Aung Hlaing, leader of Myanmar’s military-installed government, for an end to the violence that has racked the country since the military executed a coup in 2021. It would turn out to be a controversial encounter. At the time, civil society groups called for Heyzer’s mandate to be revoked, worried that the meeting legitimized the junta’s position in the country. In a statement describing the encounter, she said that wasn’t the case. The junta then criticized Heyzer’s account, saying it “created misunderstandings about Myanmar.” As a result, the envoy pledged not to return unless it was for a more “meaningful” interaction. During her 20-month tenure, Heyzer’s aim was to smoothen the transition back to democracy in Myanmar, see political prisoners released, and get more aid delivered to those in need. But in March, Heyzer — a Singaporean national and former executive secretary of the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific — shared with the U.N. General Assembly that “there [was] no prospect for a negotiated settlement.” The regime, she said, was focused on blocking access to food, money, and information as a means to punish civilians collectively. On May 31, a U.N. spokesperson announced that Heyzer would step down at the end of her contract. Two weeks later, she was gone. A flurry of online criticism ensued, and while experts agree that Heyzer made little progress as envoy, they told Devex that they blame the role and the U.N’s approach to the Myanmar crisis rather than Heyzer herself. The role of a special envoy for Myanmar was created in 2017 initially to address the Rohingya displacement crisis. It was taken up by Swiss diplomat Christine Schraner-Burgener in 2018 before Heyzer replaced her toward the end of 2021 with a broader remit of ending the violence amid the current conflict. Myanmar’s military has been battling resistance forces since its coup in February 2021 and has launched a series of attacks on civilians. This has resulted in more than 23,000 arrests, including of children, over 3,000 civilian deaths in the first 20 months of the coup alone, and the displacement of over 1.5 million people. “The amount of fighting in Myanmar is now higher than at any point since the 1970s,” said Stein Tønnesson, leader of the East Asia peace program at the Peace Research Institute Oslo. “It’s one of the top worst conflicts in the world today.” While all envoys are dispatched “to encourage dialogue, compromise, and the peaceful resolution of tensions,” Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch's Asia division, believes Heyzer was unable to make progress in Myanmar because the junta’s State Administration Council doesn’t yet have an interest in external mediation. This made her job “almost impossible,” he said. “Gandhi couldn't have done it. Obama couldn't have done it. There wasn't anybody who was going to be able to square this circle at this point with the SAC military.” Instead, he believes the military needs to be encouraged to enter discussions and that it’s up to countries to further cut off the junta’s access to aid and weapons in order to do that. It’s the U.N.’s commitment to high-level diplomacy writ large that needs to be looked at rather than blaming Heyzer, said David Scott Mathieson, an independent analyst on Myanmar. Thus far, Robertson believes the U.N.’s approach has involved looking to a divided Association of Southeast Asian Nations to take the lead. Despite adopting a resolution on Myanmar at the end of 2022 which called for a de-escalation of tensions, there’s been no consensus within the U.N. Security Council on how to tackle Myanmar, he said. And while ASEAN put together a peace plan in 2021, known as the “Five-Point Consensus,” which was agreed to by the SAC, it has failed to implement it. Earlier this month, Thailand hosted an informal meeting among countries affected by the situation in Myanmar aimed at advancing ASEAN’s efforts to resolve the situation. But this was met with condemnation from over 300 local civil society organizations who believed the gathering, in its informal nature, was a breach of ASEAN policy. ASEAN had previously decided not to allow any SAC generals to attend its summits after the failure to implement the consensus. Tom Andrews, the U.N. special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, urged ASEAN to do more to hold the junta accountable. But the U.N. is leaving a task to ASEAN that it’s not able to perform, Tønnesson said, because ASEAN itself is divided on the topic. Additionally, research describes ASEAN as having been “designed as a trust-building mechanism … rather than as a platform for mediating disputes.” An emphasis on consensus and non-interference “prevents it from effectively intervening in intrastate conflicts.” Tønnesson appreciated, he said, Heyzer’s “relatively discreet” approach in trying to establish more cooperation between the ASEAN countries, adding that she also deserves credit for pushing for the creation of an Inclusive Humanitarian Forum as a means of increasing aid delivery in the country. What happens next? Online, commentators have called for Heyzer not to be replaced while the political situation remains at such a stalemate. “We've got two examples of two envoys who didn't make a dent at all,” said Mathieson, while Banya, the founder of the Karenni Human Rights Group, who asked to be referred to only by his first name, said the role just doesn’t work right now. He blames “the rules and regulations of the U.N. itself” as well as member states’ varying interests in the country. Despite this, the U.N. plans to install a new envoy. While Robertson agreed the role “is largely ineffective,” he believes it’s still worth having because it keeps Myanmar on the U.N. secretary-general’s agenda. “What they need to have is someone who is an activist, who is prepared to work with the mandate of the U.N. secretary-general and the U.N. Security Council … and really try to drive a wider global political coalition to do something about Myanmar and that could include putting pressure on Myanmar to come to the table,” he said, adding that they should also work more closely with Andrews in his role as rapporteur. Robertson suggested Marzuki Darusman, the former attorney general of Indonesia, or a senior human rights advocate. For Mathieson, it should be someone able to take a stronger stance. “You should have someone who says, ‘You guys are a bunch of murderous dogs, you're destroying your own country, we’re trying to find a way out of it. I'm not going to be neutral. I'm on the side of the people of Myanmar, which doesn't mean I'm on the side of the resistance. It means that I'm on the people's side and I'm here to negotiate that.’” He also believes anyone from Switzerland or Scandinavia should be excluded from consideration. “That brand of diplomacy is just not needed. … It can't be an American. It probably can't be anyone from the permanent five member states, so that narrows it down; it has to be someone from the Asia Pacific.” To bolster the role, Robertson also suggested the formation of a U.N. Friends of Myanmar group where governments pressure others to undercut the support the military receives from outside. The Center for Strategic and International Studies has suggested it create a commission “similar to efforts focused on rebuilding Ukraine after the war ends.” Ultimately, it’s the system that needs to change, Mathieson said, not the person. Update, July 5, 2023: This article has been updated to clarify a comment from Phil Robertson.