Watchdog exposes problems with USAID’s 2021 Afghanistan evacuation
A new report by USAID's independent watchdog found that the agency struggled to support implementing partners during the chaotic 2021 evacuation from Afghanistan.
By Michael Igoe // 19 March 2024USAID’s efforts during the chaotic evacuation of international development personnel from Afghanistan in 2021 were hamstrung by unclear roles, inadequate planning, insufficient staff, information gaps, and communication delays, according to a new report from the agency’s independent watchdog. When the Afghan government suddenly collapsed and the Taliban took control of Kabul on Aug. 15, 2021, the United States government “confronted a task of unprecedented scale and complexity to help coordinate and execute a massive evacuation from a chaotic and dangerous environment through the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul,” read the report from USAID’s Office of the Inspector General. But as the agency scrambled to assist its implementing partners in navigating the logistical and bureaucratic hurdles to evacuate their staff — including Afghans vulnerable to Taliban persecution due to their association with the U.S. — it found itself without a playbook or clear answers about its authority, the watchdog found. “We couldn’t give people good answers because there weren’t good answers to give,” one senior staff member from USAID’s Afghanistan mission told OIG. The report, published on OIG’s website Monday, described an overarching ambiguity about USAID’s role and responsibilities during the evacuation of implementing partner staff — the contractors and NGOs who had helped the agency deliver $818.8 million in annual development programs to the country. OIG conducted its investigation in response to requests from the U.S. Congress, due to lawmakers’ concerns that Afghans who worked with USAID were put at risk by delays in leaving the country. It examined three mechanisms that allow Afghan nationals who worked with USAID to resettle in the United States: the special immigrant visa program, the State Department’s Priority 2 program, and the U.S. refugee admissions program. People who spoke to OIG echoed the widely held belief that the entire U.S. government failed to adequately plan for the possibility of a Taliban takeover and the need for evacuation — and they said the U.S. Agency for International Development was no different. A USAID staff member told the watchdog that the agency “did not conduct scenario planning to prepare for the evacuation” or consider the differences in how foreign service nationals, implementer staff, and expatriate staff might be treated. Agency staff interviewed by OIG said that “because of the novel nature of the crisis, USAID did not have clear legal or programmatic guidance on how to handle evacuating implementers.” Implementers, meanwhile, shared “differing opinions about whether USAID’s role was clear,” with some stating they “understood it was their organization’s responsibility to evacuate their staff.” In the hectic and dangerous situation at the Kabul International Airport, USAID’s role was also constrained and confused by a lack of staff to assist implementing partners with evacuation, the report found. “According to mission staff, nobody was at the airport to assist USAID and implementer staff immediately after August 15 because USAID/Afghanistan’s leadership had been evacuated,” the report read. Two USAID staff members told OIG that “the lack of a senior USAID official at the airport made it difficult to advocate for implementer staff with the State Department and coordinate efforts of Agency personnel.” “Amid deeply challenging circumstances, USAID staff in Afghanistan, Washington, and around the world made extraordinary efforts to help assist and evacuate staff, contractors, and partners, and to support the wider U.S. government evacuation efforts,” a USAID spokesperson wrote to Devex in response to questions about the report. “USAID was able to support the departure from Afghanistan of all of our local staff who chose to leave the country, as well as hundreds of their family members. We also undertook a range of efforts to support the departure of implementing partner staff, family members, and other individuals. This work continues, as does our commitment to supporting the people of Afghanistan through our humanitarian assistance and development programming,” the spokesperson added. Following President Joe Biden’s April 14, 2021, announcement of a full U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan after a two-decade presence in the country, the State Department ordered the departure of nonessential personnel on April 27. USAID’s footprint in Afghanistan had already been reduced because most of the agency’s staff worked remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the report read. By Aug. 31, according to the report, all USAID personnel had left Afghanistan except for a few foreign service national staff — local, non-U.S. citizens employed by USAID — who decided to remain. “Many implementers said that individual USAID staff did the best they could in a difficult situation,” the report read. The report noted that while this was “the first time in USAID history that the Agency attempted to evacuate cooperating country nationals,” some mission personnel believed that “USAID should have had a plan.” USAID’s watchdog also echoed long-standing concerns about the agency’s staffing levels and noted that staffing shortages — compounded by the fact that “mission staff were not able to help with evacuation because they themselves were evacuating” — hindered its ability to respond to the crisis. The lack of staff also “exacted a toll on those involved, including physical and mental effects from the stress of their involvement in the evacuation,” OIG found.
USAID’s efforts during the chaotic evacuation of international development personnel from Afghanistan in 2021 were hamstrung by unclear roles, inadequate planning, insufficient staff, information gaps, and communication delays, according to a new report from the agency’s independent watchdog.
When the Afghan government suddenly collapsed and the Taliban took control of Kabul on Aug. 15, 2021, the United States government “confronted a task of unprecedented scale and complexity to help coordinate and execute a massive evacuation from a chaotic and dangerous environment through the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul,” read the report from USAID’s Office of the Inspector General.
But as the agency scrambled to assist its implementing partners in navigating the logistical and bureaucratic hurdles to evacuate their staff — including Afghans vulnerable to Taliban persecution due to their association with the U.S. — it found itself without a playbook or clear answers about its authority, the watchdog found.
This story is forDevex Promembers
Unlock this story now with a 15-day free trial of Devex Pro.
With a Devex Pro subscription you'll get access to deeper analysis and exclusive insights from our reporters and analysts.
Start my free trialRequest a group subscription Printing articles to share with others is a breach of our terms and conditions and copyright policy. Please use the sharing options on the left side of the article. Devex Pro members may share up to 10 articles per month using the Pro share tool ( ).
Michael Igoe is a Senior Reporter with Devex, based in Washington, D.C. He covers U.S. foreign aid, global health, climate change, and development finance. Prior to joining Devex, Michael researched water management and climate change adaptation in post-Soviet Central Asia, where he also wrote for EurasiaNet. Michael earned his bachelor's degree from Bowdoin College, where he majored in Russian, and his master’s degree from the University of Montana, where he studied international conservation and development.