3 things we have lost with the dissolution of USAID

Among the many tragedies that have followed the dissolution of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. government has lost three things that we will need to reconstitute if we are to have an effective development assistance function as an instrument of U.S. soft power in the future. These losses extend beyond the budget cuts. They encompass a critical absence in strategic foreign policy planning, the abandonment of core capabilities that directly advanced U.S. economic and security interests, and a severe, potentially irreparable, blow to America's standing as a reliable partner on the global stage. Recovering these essential components must be the starting point for any future strategy to reestablish U.S. leadership in global development. 1. A long-term perspective in foreign policy formulation First, with the dismissal of approximately 95% of USAID’s more than 10,000 staff members, the U.S. government has lost an important voice for a long-term perspective in formulating national security policy and strategy. USAID’s development professionals were members of interagency country teams in the field and National Security Council-chaired policy coordination committees in Washington, D.C. They consistently advocated for the prioritization of policies and approaches that would foster the development of local institutions in lower-income countries — efforts that aimed to eventually eliminate the need for foreign assistance. State Department officers generally have shorter tours of duty than USAID officers, whose work typically reflects a five- to 10-year planning horizon. In Somalia, where the standard State Department assignment was one year, I constantly reminded my USAID staff to voice their longer-term perspectives in their engagements with embassy colleagues — because if we did not, no one else in the country team would. Certainly, my best U.S. ambassadors appreciated and had an instinct for the longer-term implications of different policy options, but USAID’s absence means that perspective may no longer consistently be part of policy deliberations. The good news is that this is recoverable if the State Department creates a development cadre within its staffing pattern — and grants them longer tours of duty overseas to encourage a longer-term perspective. 2. Assistance capabilities that advance US interests Second, the U.S. government has lost many important foreign assistance capabilities. These were embodied in USAID personnel — both technical and operational — but also within the American, international, and local NGOs and contractors that implemented programs on behalf of USAID. In dissolving USAID, the administration exclusively focused on maintaining a few capabilities to undertake lifesaving work. As a result, we have lost people and programs working to prevent and counter violent extremism; strengthen the integrity of critical mineral supply chains; improve governance, including people and programs helping countries with the mobilization of their domestic resources for development; and facilitate trade and investment. For example, USAID housed the Prosper Africa and Power Africa initiatives. The former, a Trump 1.0 administration creation designed to accelerate two-way trade and investment between Africa and the United States, generated $13 of private investment in Africa for every dollar of U.S. government investment. Power Africa, a U.S.-led public-private partnership that aimed to double energy access in Africa, boasted an even more robust 25:1 ratio. “We have suffered a tremendous loss of credibility as a trusted partner in development owing to the way USAID’s dissolution was handled.” --— The cancellation of Power Africa investment facilitation efforts left $21 billion of deals involving U.S. companies on the table. And it is simply not the case that other U.S. government agencies will be able to pick up the slack: The Development Finance Corporation, which partners with the private sector to mobilize capital for strategic investments, often relied on USAID staff in the field to identify potential opportunities for investment, support due diligence reviews, and facilitate negotiations. Those personnel were all let go. We also lost program designers, program monitors, procurement specialists, and financial analysts. If the U.S. government intends to do more direct government-to-government assistance and deliver more assistance through local organizations — things USAID was rightly criticized for not doing enough of — we will need people in the field who understand host-country financial systems and can monitor delivery and achievement of results for proper accountability of U.S. taxpayer resources. Some of these capabilities can likely be rebuilt, but doing so needs to start with a vision and strategy for foreign assistance, which to date has been lacking. The personnel, systems, and programs should then be rebuilt around that. 3. The US reputation on the line Finally, I fear we have suffered a tremendous loss of credibility as a trusted partner in development owing to the way USAID’s dissolution was handled. Hundreds of implementers that we used to partner with have yet to be paid for work completed on behalf of the U.S. government — over nine months after the administration began its “pause” on foreign assistance. That is as egregious a breach of trust as I can think of. In the meantime, many organizations have gone completely belly-up, particularly local organizations in the countries in which USAID used to operate. But even more importantly, I believe we showed government counterparts in these countries that the U.S. government can no longer be counted on to honor its agreements. I used to tell my host-country counterparts that it took us a long time to get new programs off the ground because I had to get the State Department, Office of Management and Budget, and sometimes even the NSC on board; then I had to convince four Congressional committees of the merits of the program. But once I had all of that buy-in across the U.S. government, they could absolutely count on us to deliver. Given the unilateral cancellation of agreements and the complete lack of notice and discussion with supposed “partner” governments, leaving them no time to plan for alternatives, I could not say that to a counterpart anymore — because I don’t believe it, and I don’t think they should either. I frankly do not know what can be done to recover the trust in the word of the U.S. government that has been lost. It is probably not a short-term proposition, which is why I am pessimistic that the United States might be able to recover the mantle of a development leader in what remains of my professional lifetime. Of course, it’s also the case that the U.S. government is suffering from a crisis of credibility with foreign partners beyond just the development sector. But we can at least start with paying implementers what they are owed for work completed on behalf of the U.S. government — the government should pay its bills, full stop. Whatever the next chapter of U.S. development assistance might be, it’s going to need the full backing of Congress to have any chance of restoring U.S. credibility in the eyes of partner countries.