Are UK aid commitments to equality and localization failing in Sudan?

When the United Kingdom doubled its aid to Sudan and neighboring countries this year — announcing £231 million (about $306 million) as famine spread and mass atrocities escalated — ministers framed it as proof that Sudan remained a priority. The U.K. had designated Sudan one of only three “humanitarian priority” crises, alongside Ukraine and Gaza, and officials pointed to rapid disbursements and strong relationships with United Nations agencies as signs of renewed leadership. But a closer look at a series of recent assessments — including a damning review by the U.K.’s independent aid watchdog ICAI, two parliamentary hearings, and new testimonies from Sudanese civil society and U.K. NGOs — suggests a different picture. It’s one of a system struggling to adapt to “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis,” constrained by architecture designed for large, risk-averse intermediaries and undermined by volatile budgets. The central question the recent commentary raises is stark: Can the U.K.’s aid system — built for large-scale delivery chains and heavy compliance — actually deliver on its localization and gender commitments in a crisis like Sudan? Violence against women At an International Development Committee hearing on Oct. 14, Sudanese activist Hanin Ahmed, a senior organizer in Sudan’s Emergency Response Rooms, or ERR, a nationwide network of civilian-led mutual-aid groups, testified before MPs. Hanin Ahmed, who told MPs she had recently been put forward for a Nobel Peace Prize as part of a collective nomination of Sudanese women, described the conflict as one in which women are being deliberately targeted — through systematic rape, abductions, trafficking, and attacks on the female responders leading the humanitarian effort. She said women-led groups have been running safe shelters, communal kitchens, evacuation routes, and psychosocial clinics, but with “no protection plan or protection mechanism.” She described the case of one ERR responder raped by fighters from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, re-attacked after speaking out, and who later went missing before being rescued. When ERR funding from one donor was cut earlier this year, Hanin Ahmed said, they were forced to close safe houses and halt evacuations. “We could no longer keep people alive.” Localization stuck at the margins Bashàïr Ahmed, the U.K.-based founder and former CEO of Shabaka, an organization focused on diaspora-led humanitarian response, has been similarly critical of the aid architecture. In a recent LinkedIn post, she described it as “inefficient” and “a colonial funding structure that extracts decision-making power upwards,” noting that Sudanese organizations receive only a tiny share of funding directly. The data corroborates this: Since 2023, just 1.5% of allocations from the U.N.-managed Sudan Humanitarian Fund have gone to local partners without passing through intermediaries. The U.K. sits on the SHF’s advisory board, which is responsible for overseeing the fund’s strategic direction, funding allocations, and localization approach. “Mutual aid groups have the widest access, but get almost none of the funding,” she told Devex. “Everyone else is treated as temporary, and in Sudan that simply isn’t how this crisis works.” One Sudanese group she works with applied for just $5,000 from an international donor. They had community access, volunteers, and a clear plan — but were stymied by English-only application forms, multi-stage proposal processes, and months of silence. “It becomes about how well you push the paperwork,” she said. “Not how close you are to communities.” These examples align with the Independent Commission for Aid Impact’s conclusion that the U.K.’s compliance systems and delivery model constrain direct support to small, women-led, and mutual-aid organizations. The watchdog barks ICAI’s review of six years of U.K. engagement with Sudan presents a mixed picture. The watchdog acknowledges areas of strong performance, including the U.K.’s influential role during the 2019-21 transition, the speed with which aid was redirected to Chad and South Sudan after April 2023, and the recent increase in humanitarian allocations. But it also highlights several structural weaknesses that limit the U.K.’s effectiveness in a crisis of this scale. One is the impact of the U.K.’s aid cuts in 2021-22, which ICAI says weakened relationships with partners and created uncertainty across the system. Although funding has since risen sharply, ICAI notes that repeated volatility has made long-term planning more difficult for Sudanese civil society and international partners alike. Localization remains one of the sticking points, according to the ICAI analysis. While the U.K. has long emphasised the importance of working with local players, direct support to Sudanese organizations is described as “very limited.” ICAI also warns that although gender is a stated priority for the U.K., it’s not clear that this has translated into meaningful improvements for women and girls, particularly in a context where conflict-related sexual violence has escalated sharply. A recurring theme in ICAI’s review is the inconsistency of political attention. The watchdog notes that Sudan has not always received sustained senior-level focus, despite the scale of the crisis. For ICAI Commissioner Liz Ditchburn, who led the review, these gaps matter: She warned in October that without consistent ministerial attention and a more coherent regional strategy, the U.K.’s ability to shape outcomes in Sudan will remain constrained. Bond, the U.K.’s network of development and humanitarian NGOs, echoed ICAI’s concerns. Its director of policy and advocacy, Gideon Rabinowitz, said in a statement that the U.K.’s recent funding increases were welcome but warned that volatility and heavy compliance had weakened trust with Sudanese partners. Meanwhile, Kayode Akintola, its head of region for Africa for Catholic charity CAFOD, told Devex that the U.K.’s aid architecture was originally designed around large international agencies with substantial due diligence systems. “That approach doesn’t work in Sudan,” he said. The limits of UK influence The U.K.’s diplomatic role also came under scrutiny during parliamentary hearings this autumn. As the U.N. Security Council penholder on Sudan, the U.K. has a prominent position in international efforts to protect civilians and address atrocities. However, at an International Development Committee hearing on Oct. 28, International Development Minister Jenny Chapman told MPs that such prevention “seems to be beyond the international community’s ability at the moment.” For Sudanese witnesses, this was a troubling signal. Their testimony emphasised that violence against civilians is intensifying, and that diplomatic pressure on the warring parties is essential for creating any form of humanitarian access or safety. “What is being said about Sudan is a PR exercise to deal away with the failure. People are being killed now. Saying ‘we’ll seek accountability later’ doesn’t help,” said Bashàïr Ahmed. ICAI, too, observed that although the U.K. has been active on paper, the overall international response has been perceived as falling short. Bashàïr Ahmed argues that the U.K.’s challenges in Sudan are not technical but political. She points to examples from other crises in Syria, Myanmar, and Ukraine, where donors have used flexible pooled funds, cross-border arrangements, or specialized vetting platforms to channel money directly to national organizations. “There’s proof of concept,” she said. “But you need the political will to push that forward.” She also argues that Sudanese diaspora communities are an underused asset. While the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, or FCDO, officials have made attempts to engage them, she says this engagement is inconsistent and affected by staff turnover. She notes that diaspora groups often lack access to formal decision-making spaces, and that attitudes within the international system — including what she described as “white-savior” dynamics — can shut them out further. In response to questions from Devex, an FCDO spokesperson pointed to the Foreign Secretary’s recent statement highlighting the U.K.’s £125 million commitment to Sudan and its push for a three-month humanitarian truce. U.K. officials speaking on background said the U.K. is also supporting documentation and accountability efforts through the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission, the International Criminal Court, and the U.K.-funded Sudan Witness Project. They said the U.K. is backing “locally led initiatives” via the OCHA-managed Sudan Humanitarian Fund and a Mercy Corps-led cash consortium that channels resources to local players. For Bashàïr Ahmed, Sudan remains a defining test of whether the U.K. can deliver on its stated priorities of localization and gender equality. “If the U.K. cannot deliver on its promises in a crisis this extreme,” she said, “It risks becoming a middling backwater rather than a global leader.”