Q&A: ICRC chief on why international NGOs 'are at extreme risk'

WASHINGTON — Humanitarian leaders face a difficult challenge. At the same time they are being asked to shift more of their programming to conflict situations, they are also encountering a system of donor compliance regimes that make that work nearly impossible. “On one hand I think everybody agrees, yes we need to focus on [protracted conflict] ... The reality is that when you start to zoom in, there is such an obsession about security and terrorism that the environment in which you will be able to operate is much more difficult than even a year ago,” said Yves Daccord, director-general of the International Committee of the Red Cross. “We don't want to implement the objective of the World Bank. We've been very clear with governments. That's why we're not part of the U.N.” --— Yves Daccord, director-general, ICRC Daccord worries that some international NGOs will struggle as the emphasis shifts from natural disasters — which are increasingly managed by local and national entities — to protracted conflict, which introduces new and complex challenges of politics, security, access, and alignment. “Watch carefully. A few of them will disappear soon,” he said. This interview has been edited for clarity and length. Are you finding some evolution from how the development community has approached highly politicized stability operations in the past? The jury's still out. There is one [piece of] good news. I’ve found that the push, the focus on protracted conflict, somewhat, has obsessed everybody, and has allowed everybody to focus on that. If you look at the international community, there is less obsession about natural disaster, even if we are living in a time where climate change has an impact … With few exceptions, you can see that localization has happened in natural disaster … in terms of having state actors, local or national — not all of them, but most of them — in a better place than they were a few years ago. That sounds to me like there are two response systems developing. On the natural disaster side, you've had what you would consider a fairly successful effort to build these local systems. But on the protracted crisis — the conflict side — this is still a largely international issue. Syria is a good example. I mean how do you allow the Syrian people to find solutions? It's almost impossible. What you can do is you can contain. Or, you are trying to propose solutions — and of course, we're living in a world where most of these contexts are not just national anymore. Yemen is a very good example. Iraq. Sahel. You have international interventions — the local and the regional powers are intervening, which makes it very, very complex. As we don't have right now a system to produce consensus, it's very, very difficult. On one side, the concern about national security and terrorism is a factor driving conflict, and then on the other side, it's also a factor changing the operating environment for organizations such as yours who face these anti-terror financing laws and things like that. It's the combination of the development world and international community who has to deal with reality. And it's OK to deal with reality when it's a natural disaster. It's much more complex to deal with reality when it comes to armed conflict. Why? Because the reality is that you have to accept, somewhat, that part of territories is controlled, in most of the cases, by forces which are not the legitimate government. And in most of these places, the national government is not in a position to provide basic services to this population. And that's what is interesting over the past few years — I really think the World Bank got it in terms of concept, but then they have to manage it in the due diligence processes, and this is where it starts to be difficult. The due diligence process, and not just the World Bank. The World Bank is pretty interesting, but even classical country like the United Kingdom or others. They are totally clear on the vision — we need to invest in protracted crisis — but their due diligence systems are moving very quickly toward zero risk tolerance. The two goals are incompatible. The governments find it very difficult to manage because on one hand they want to intervene, but on the other hand, there are these sanctions, due diligence, counterterrorism, which make the solution very complicated for organizations like us. What is the argument you take to them? I'm sure that you're sympathetic, to some degree, to their national security concerns, and yet you have this view from the ground level of how the legislation or the safeguards that they're putting in place restrict humanitarian operations. Where do you try to find the balance between these two concerns? Our mandate is to look for people who need to be protected. Very clear ... My experience, what I've seen is, if you start to connect humanitarian response with a political agenda and you start to push it further and say, "I cannot provide you [assistance], because the people who control you are terrorists,” then what you create is a dynamic which is very, very negative — not just for a country, but for the communities. Let's be very clear. What we have right now is a situation where Sunni extremism — mainly, not only — is perceived as extreme danger. Most of the groups are jihadists coming from the Sunni side. There is a real risk that Sunni people, because of measures, because of the pressure, and of course related to a lot of propaganda, feel that they are disempowered and targeted by the international community, which is very problematic. That's really problematic in Iraq, for example. Really we understand the constraints and the concern about terrorism. It makes a lot of sense. But please, let's discuss concretely what it means when we apply that. As an organization, we come in with a very specific business model. We are delivering ourselves, and we go and we want to be able to negotiate with, in fact, all groups, whatever the labels are. That sounds to some degree like ICRC taking on a lot of the risk in those contexts. How much risk are you comfortable taking on? It's not so much about the risk you're taking. It's about ... almost the psychological, social, and political contract that you have with the people supporting you. And that's what's so interesting with the World Bank. We don't want to implement the objective of the World Bank. We've been very clear with governments. That's why we're not part of the U.N. [...] We come with our assessment, of course, we'll compare [it with yours]. We'll be very careful, and we think it's good that you are also checking us, auditing us, very high level of accountability. But what I need is to make sure that I'm able to operate in an environment where I'm assessing the need and the constraint myself, and that you don't tell me, "This is our objective. Now implement that objective." ... I also want you, if you finance me, to accept that my accountability system, that my governance system, that my compliance system are at a high level. You can check them. But I want you then, when you say, “OK let's go,” to trust me. It would be difficult to take risk if the risk is just transferred to the partner and the partner just has to implement [the donor’s objective] ... and I'm nervous about some of the international NGOs, who are now in a situation where they don't have the chance to be able to discuss and engage with states at that level. Watch carefully. A few of them will disappear soon. You think so? My prediction. We'll see. Can you say which ones you think might disappear? International NGOs are at extreme risk. Why is that? Because of the cost to operate in these environments. If you're an international NGO, you were able to operate in natural disasters and in conflict. What has changed is the entire money — government money — over the past three, four years now is focused on protracted conflict. Natural disaster is still very important, but natural disaster is now much more managed by national entities with very specific financing. So international NGOs have to follow where the money goes, where the needs are — and then the cost to operate in this environment — between compliance, between security, between your own ability to operate versus being an implementing partner makes it, honestly, extraordinarily complex. It's interesting to observe organizations that have gone through a very, very challenging time over the past few years. Watch carefully. They will have — and we will all have, because I feel the pressure on my own organization — to find a solution. The only difference is we have worked [in conflict] with all the problems around that. But still, security is very difficult. “Government money — over the past three, four years now is focused on protracted conflict.” --— I've spent ... four months out of the [past] nine months without a hostage [situation]. It's crazy. If you know what it means having a hostage [situation], if you want to be serious about taking care of your people, that's a huge constraint as an organization — negotiating access, discussing with all these nonstate armed groups, governments, managing the new sanctions regimes, the new counterterrorism [agendas]. You have to be very well equipped to be able to do that, have a strong diplomatic network, strong understanding. We are lucky because we have this incredibly strong mandate related to international humanitarian law, which gives us certain leverage. If you're an international NGO, wow, tough time ahead. And we have to be careful because if they are not able to operate anymore, or only very remotely, that will change the situation dramatically. From a very practical perspective, is it simply more expensive to work in protracted conflict? It's too expensive, and donors will not pay for it. They will transfer risk. So they won't be able to do it. Is there any bargain to be struck there in terms of who bears that cost? That was one of the discussions around the grand bargain, but it's complicated. I don't think people want to discuss that. Governments ... would tell you, "Sorry that's the price to pay. We live in an environment where failure is the main factor. As a government I can't make any mistakes, so that's your problem it's not mine.” The spring meetings, of course, don’t speak about it, but then some of the discussions in the corridors are more interesting. I know that you have been pleased to see the World Bank enter the humanitarian space and find ways to bring their resources to humanitarian crises. They're in the midst of a leadership transition. Do you have any concerns about the role the bank might play moving forward — particularly given that now it's led by someone who's more affiliated with an administration that has very specific geopolitical interests? Our perception of the World Bank was not so much that they were involved in humanitarian work. It's that they were connecting fragility and extreme poverty with conflict. I really want to insist on the notion of conflict, because “humanitarian” is so broad. The focus will remain ... If the world bank is true to its vision — and I think they will [be] and including the new president. It's about extreme poverty, and extreme poverty doesn't happen only in conflict, but all the projections, all the figures show that if nothing is done 50% of extreme poverty in 2030 will be in conflict areas.