The difficult debate over local aid worker security

When Gaza was pummeled by airstrikes this year, international agencies evacuated staff and sent them back to headquarters or to their offices in Jerusalem — an oft-repeated course of action for nongovernmental organizations working in conflict-affected areas. Early this year, a number of international NGOs left the Central African Republic when violence began to escalate. A few months after that, some organizations in the coastal areas of Kenya suspended staff travel and pulled out foreign volunteers, following a spate of attacks in the area. Evacuating staff is certainly understandable, but it often comes at a cost. Programs don’t stop running when expatriates are pulled out from conflict zones; national staff and local partners are often left to continue operations — and fend for themselves, because of a widespread belief that their background and local knowledge make them less susceptible to danger. An aid worker security expert suggests this is an all-too familiar albeit uninformed way of how international groups perceive risks on the ground. “I think it’s particularly a lack of understanding of the complexities of risk [to different types of aid workers],” Larissa Fast, assistant professor at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame who just recently published a book titled “Aid in Danger,” explained to Devex. Local risks A local driver helping deliver humanitarian aid in northern Syria was killed in April 2013. A local ambulance driver, according to the Libyan Red Crescent, was also killed in an attack last June. These incidents — and many more — underscore the reality that not all security threats affect or solely target expatriates. Drivers, in particular, face high risks when crossing borders and dealing with different armed groups for access. And while local implementers may be more knowledgeable of the local context, they may sometimes be at greater risk, especially if they belong to the same ethnic or religious group mired in conflict — such as the Kachins in Myanmar, Muslims in the Central African Republic or Palestinians in Gaza. Izzat Zeidan of the Agricultural Development Association, a local implementing organization in the Palestinian territories, told Devex how they felt abandoned when all of a sudden, international groups “disappeared” from the ground. The official, who heads program and community development at the organization, is understandably frustrated, given that these are the times when support from large, international groups is crucial — to facilitate communication, for instance. Training for all? International NGOs Devex spoke to argue they do provide security training and manuals to both international and local staff to help address these security issues. At Médecins Sans Frontières, which works in some of the most dangerous places globally, security is discussed at the point of recruitment, MSF Paris Deputy Executive Director Benoît Leduc told Devex. All national and foreign staff members assigned to missions are trained and given a number of modules on security. While foreign staff are briefed prior to departure and upon arrival in their field assignments, locals are apprised of security measures on the ground. MSF Paris may also send some national staff members to headquarters for additional training. Nationals recruited to work in a different part of their country — a doctor in Juba may be asked to work in a remote area in South Sudan, for example — are briefed on issues such as evacuation logistics as well. At Christian Aid, the security rating of the country of deployment determines the type of training required of staff. Everyone is required to take an online security course consisting of 13 modules upon joining an organization. But those traveling to a country with a security code of 3 or higher — places like Afghanistan — need to undergo an additional three or four days of training. In a document shared with Devex, Christian Aid stipulates that no one is authorized to travel on its behalf without undergoing all of the necessary training. Both organizations argue staff can decline travel or leave if they feel insecure or uncomfortable in a given situation. MSF’s Leduc also stressed that staff won’t be blamed or fired for doing so. But does the training equally address risks facing both national and international staff? Or, as Fast suspects, is it a “one-size-fits-all” type of training where risks specific to a particular group of staff members are not taken into account? Training and modules, for example, may skew heavily toward kidnapping issues — a huge concern for foreign aid workers but not so for national staff. “I think it’s really important to differentiate and look at the risk profile for different types of staff … and the risks faced by different positions,” Fast said, adding that local partners should receive targeted training as well — a sentiment that Zeidan shares. The ADA official said it rarely receives risk-specific training and only from some international partners. According to Christian Aid’s security guidelines, the organization’s partners “are responsible for managing their own security. Christian Aid will support them in this, including supporting capacity building, if they so request and if Christian Aid is able to do so.” “Not because you have a beautiful guideline or [standard operating procedure] validated by an expert [means] you are protected.” --— MSF Paris Deputy Executive Director Benoît Leduc But Corporate Security Manager Brian Martin stressed that its local implementing partners are trained alongside its national staff. Four local partners received Christian Aid-organized training last month in Malawi; another four participated in a similar exercise in August in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, Martin himself conducted a security audit this year with one local partner. The problem with training Fast acknowledged there are problems associated with the kind of security training given to the aid community, and suggested different ways to resolve such issues. Among them is for donors to mandate organizations to give more attention to the security of local staff and partners. Another is for local organizations themselves to explicitly ask for risk-specific training from their international partners — a suggestion Zeidan objected to. “Should we explicitly ask them? Is it not in their mandate?” Zeidan countered. But an international NGO official who spoke on condition of anonymity is pinning the problem on local partners that only took security measures seriously after attacks on local aid workers increased considerably. A consent-based form of security is needed as well, according to Fast. The aid security expert did admit that there’s no one particular response to these challenges. For example, providing increased training to a wider set of people would mean higher costs for the organization, so if donors are to require that, they should follow it with a budget allocation. Providing more “tools” and a set of guidelines don’t always guarantee security, too. “Not because you have a beautiful guideline or [standard operating procedure] validated by an expert [means] you are protected,” MSF’s Leduc said, citing U.N. compounds around the world as an example. “The U.N. compound in the Philippines after [Typhoon Haiyan] is exactly the same in a war-torn country in West Africa: high walls, barbed wires. The security seems like it comes with a kit, which [should not be] the case,” he said. Check out more insights and analysis provided to hundreds of Executive Members worldwide, and subscribe to the Development Insider to receive the latest news, trends and policies that influence your organization.