What lay behind the deaths of 7 World Central Kitchen staff in Gaza

Just over a year ago, a World Central Kitchen employee sent an email to those at the organization’s helm. Urgent, his email was titled. Personnel safety concerns. It was early March — less than a month before the Israel Defense Forces killed seven of the nonprofit’s staff. “I have first hand witnessed this organization disregard safety many times in the past,” wrote Brack Watters, a distribution operations manager who’d deployed with WCK to Ukraine, Turkey, Haiti, and beyond. “I feel it is happening again and on a level that is completely unacceptable.” Now working on the organization’s response in Gaza, Watters penned the email, which was obtained by Devex through another staffer, from his Cairo base. Before WCK, Watters had been a survival instructor in the United States Air Force, something he brought up in the letter to make his understanding of the context clear. Israeli forces had already killed a “staggering” number of civilians, Watters wrote. At that time, the death toll was more than 30,000. WCK’s own security personnel — many of whom were army and marine veterans — “don’t agree with what we are doing putting our people at risk like this.” And Damian Sobol, a WCK contractor in Gaza, had been nearly killed by an explosive, he wrote, one that landed 40 meters from Sobol and hit an aid truck nearby. “I love that we move so quickly and usually make the impossible happen,” wrote Watters in his email, which was addressed to Erin Gore, WCK’s chief executive officer, and John McLellan, WCK’s head of safety and security. “But at what cost.” Twenty-five days later, Sobol and six other WCK staff were dead. Those deaths — the first of international aid workers in Gaza since Oct. 7, 2023 — sent shockwaves across the world. Israel took responsibility for the attack, calling it a “grave mistake” that “should not have occurred.” A report commissioned by the Australian government found the same, stating the Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, had known about WCK’s convoy before it set out, mistakenly identified a weapon being placed in a WCK vehicle, and violated its own standard operating procedures. But in the same report, there was another set of details. Armed security personnel were traveling with a WCK convoy at night. The organization’s rooftop branding couldn’t be seen well in the dark. One of WCK’s locally contracted security personnel fired their weapon from the roof of an associated truck, an action the IDF labeled as “consistent with Hamas hijacking the aid convoy,” even after that gunman split off from the group. For several former WCK staff members, those findings were indicative of something deeper — and an eventuality that, for years, many had been bracing for. “It wasn’t if someone was going to die, but when,” said Elyssa Kaplan, WCK’s former director of culinary operations. Devex spoke with 14 former and current staff members and contractors at WCK, including three involved in the organization’s response in Gaza. These employees worked at WCK between 2017 and the present, with half of them still working at the organization at the time of April 1, 2024, or later. Most of the employees agreed to speak on the condition of anonymity due to fears of professional reprisal — but over and over again, they spoke of the same. A workplace marred by risk, and a culture that let safety slide to the periphery. A lack of training, and a pattern of pushback when staff members tried to put those activities in place. And a tendency to “build the plane while flying it” across the world. “For this to happen did not come as a surprise to any of us,” said another former staff member, who left the organization in 2023. “And that makes it so much worse.” WCK refuted those allegations in a statement to Devex, stating that two of the seven team members killed by the IDF were former Royal Marines, one was a British Army veteran, a fourth had Canadian military experience, and two other international team members received “multiday safety and security awareness training” before the attack. "Any suggestion that a lack of training or security protections contributed to the events of April 1 is both malicious and contrary to these undisputed facts,” said Gore, who became WCK’s chief executive officer in March 2023. “All our team members were wearing personal protective equipment (PPE), two of the three vehicles struck were armored and well-branded, and team movements were well coordinated with the IDF.” ‘The fierce urgency of now’ WCK was created to be different from other humanitarian agencies, describing itself as a “team of food first responders” with a model of “quick action.” That’s something highlighted by the organization in a statement to Devex. “World Central Kitchen quickly mobilizes, adapts, and shows up first to the front lines in response to humanitarian, climate, and community crises around the world,” the organization wrote. “Our model is unique: when disaster strikes, we move fast to get on location, partner with communities, and dramatically scale operations to fill immense humanitarian food needs.” For the first decade of its existence, WCK focused on natural disasters — but from 2022 to today, it’s expanded that work to conflict zones. WCK brings chefs to the scene of a crisis, with teams making food in massive paella pans and distributing it to thousands. They also partner with local restaurants, paying for meals that those teams will cook, deliver, and report back on, though the model of response changes depending on the circumstance. “Feed everybody as quick as you can,” said the organization’s founder, celebrity chef and humanitarian José Andrés, in a promotional video for the organization. “Don’t tell me you are waiting to do it until you have everything ready to do it. It has to be urgent.” That’s exactly what WCK became known for: feeding millions of people while bucking the bureaucracy that often can slow down traditional humanitarian groups. The organization’s vision statement highlights how it shows up “with the fierce urgency of now,” operating with an “embrace chaos mindset” instead of “asking for permission or following systems and bureaucracy that lack urgency and flexibility.” “World Central Kitchen believes hungry people need to be fed today, not tomorrow,” WCK said in its statement to Devex. “This sense of urgency is foundational, and coupled with founder Chef José Andrés’ passion and drive, is what inspires us to start cooking and feeding where others can’t or won’t.” Andrés — a Spanish American entrepreneur with more than 30 restaurants to his name — seems to have taken that approach to heart. In 2023, he published a graphic novel titled “Feeding Dangerously.” This month, he’s releasing a book called “Change the Recipe: Because You Can’t Build a Better World Without Breaking Some Eggs.” And from WCK’s origins to today, it’s something Andrés seems to have stood behind. “Whenever people would say we should slow down, [Andrés and the executive team would say], guys, we’re building the plane in the sky,” said one former staff member, who worked at the organization until 2023. “José loved it.” The fierceness, the brazenness, the speed — it's all been described to Devex as parts of WCK’s “cult of personality,” with staff answering above all to Andrés. Elyssa Kaplan, who was laid off in August 2023, described how staff who took risks would be complimented by WCK leadership. She spoke of how Zomi Frankcom — one of those who died in the April 2024 attack — would deliver meals to at-risk communities in earthquake-shattered Haiti by herself, driving motorbikes across fragile bridges to reach isolated areas in 2021. When she returned from those trips, Kaplan said WCK leadership would tell Frankcom she had the “true heart of a humanitarian,” and that they were “proud to call [Frankcom] a member of their team.” Kaplan also said that at one point, she was trying to make a decision tree to help the organization decide which emergencies to respond to. The document ended with a joke about how, ultimately, all the above would go out the window depending on what Andrés wanted. “José is not the expert on feeding people in disasters,” said Josh Phelps, who was both the organization's former director of relief operations until 2021 and Frankcom’s ex-boyfriend. “But if he says do it this way, even if general wisdom says do it the other, people are going to do it. And that creates dangerous situations.” Yet WCK’s model is one that the 15-year-old organization has not just stuck with, but has been recognized for. Last January, former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi nominated Andrés for a Nobel Peace Prize. Last June, the organization won two Gold Anthem Awards for its work in Gaza. Earlier this year, Andrés received the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor in the United States. And from its founding until today, WCK has provided 450 million meals across the world — serving chef-prepared food to those impacted by natural disasters, human-made conflict, and other crises. “There’s so much good work that does happen. That’s a fact, and without a doubt,” said one of the former staff members, who worked with the organization for just under four years. “But so much of how that work is done comes at the expense of [WCK’s] people.” Breaking some eggs For one former staff member, that meant “sleeping wherever was possible” — including a car on the side of the road in negative degree weather — after twin earthquakes shattered Turkey. For another, that meant flying to several American cities torn by a natural disaster, and upon arrival, being told to just “figure out” how to deliver hundreds of meals to communities in desperate need. “[Deployments] feel like a bunch of high schoolers or college kids doing a fundraising project,” said another former staffer, referring to their deployments in Europe and Central America. “Everyone would kind of come and go, with no real briefing. You were really just trusting your gut.” WCK stated it “engages the services of highly qualified and trained security personnel to provide on-the-ground safety and security” to its teams. That includes daily situation briefings, regular training to staff, journey management plans to coordinate, track and record travel, WCK said, and “where deemed appropriate by security personnel,” utilizing armored vehicles and personal protective equipment. The organization said those protocols had been in place for its Gaza response since the middle of January 2024, adding that WCK's “safety and security protocols have continued to evolve in response to the number of needs of each activation.” “We have a seasoned leadership team in place — including an experienced Chief Safety and Security Officer — grown our safety and security team, enhanced the safety training that all of our relief staff receive, and continued to work hand-in-hand with the local communities on the ground who know these locations best,” the organization told Devex. Even so, Gaza was not the first time WCK entered a conflict zone. The organization began responding to the war in Ukraine immediately after Russia’s initial attack on Feb. 24, 2022, and Andrés himself arrived just five days later. In the wake of that work, WCK's revenue quadrupled from 2021 to 2022, making WCK the fastest-growing agency among its U.S.-based peers that year. The team was growing — fast. And as the organization’s impact grew, so too did its recognition. By the spring, National Geographic released “We Feed People," a documentary chronicling the rise of WCK with Andrés at the center. But by the following year, things had begun to fray. It started with sexual harassment claims: in 2023, Bloomberg revealed that it took years for WCK’s leadership to fire its former director of emergency relief after a multitude of allegations from staff. The organization then became the subject of another Bloomberg investigation, one that voiced concerns about staff safety, security, and culture, and was published around the same time WCK began its work in the Middle East. In that story, one former WCK contractor described the organization's approach to safety as “pseudo-security,” and another said there were “barely” any safety protocols during WCK deployments in Armenia, Egypt, and Morocco. The former and current staff members Devex spoke with reiterated the same, chronicling deployments and internal protocols that were haphazard, unsystematic, and brazen. “They say embrace chaos. We don’t plan. The plan takes care of itself,” Phelps told Devex. “Well, if everyone goes in without a plan and they die, well, maybe that wasn’t the right tack.” Phelps spent four years with WCK, resigning from the organization in November 2021. Earlier that year, Phelps said he was deployed to Haiti with no security training, despite arriving soon after a presidential assassination had rocked the island nation to its core. Security wasn’t consistent, he said, alleging that staff were “summarily dismissed and almost mocked” when they questioned safety procedures. Kaplan, who was in Haiti at the same time as Phelps, said she saw much of the same. When Kaplan suggested WCK refrain from sending an international team to the country given the organization’s lack of security protocols there, she was chastised by the head of WCK himself. “What? I think we need to rethink who we are and what we are,” Andrés wrote in a WhatsApp message to Kaplan and other members of the WCK team, which was later obtained by Devex. “We will respond!” It’s something that both Phelps and Kaplan said they saw over and over again. In December 2022, Kaplan headed to Ukraine — but said she received no safety training before setting foot in the war-battered country. Instead, she said she was given branded t-shirts, stickers, and lanyards, and reminded to make update videos for social media while she was deployed. “There’s no training for new staff, there’s no training for volunteers, and there’s no way to report,” said Kaplan, speaking of her time at WCK from 2019 to 2023. “Over my four years there, I saw all of those things either be distorted or ignored, blocked or dismantled.” Another former contractor, who had deployed with WCK to several disasters and war zones until last year, said it got to a point where being at the organization felt like being at “a media company doing humanitarian work on the side.” “We were doing things just to say we’re there, we’re first on the ground,” the former contractor added. “We have pictures, we have José in a helicopter. Whatever it took to be the first on the moon, without taking anything else into consideration.” Employees were sent into Ukrainian war zones with no emergency contacts on file at the human resource level, two former employees said, and when people went in and out of areas where they could not be contacted, there was no system set up to keep track of the employees’ last movements — at least, not one that those employees were aware of. In his March email, Watters described a similar trend: He and three others were sent to Ukraine “without any security plan,” and “even the security personnel with us told me how upset they were at the lack of regard for safety.” “There is a long list of examples when the organization put ‘doing the job’ above personnel safety,” Watters wrote in his email. “We don't have a department of people trained to handle seeing dead bodies, run to bomb shelters daily, escape ground militia, avoid ground forces in armed combat, keep from getting taken hostage, or know what to actually do if any of these go the wrong way.” “We should never put our staff or contractors in these scenarios without fully understand[ing] the risks (given by professionals), having plans for different potential scenarios, having fully trained them on how to handle different situations, and most important really assessing whether what we are about to ask them to do needs to be done by us or is there another way to accomplish the same goal,” he added. Stretched thin In 2023, there were other signs of volatility. According to WCK’s own reports, it fell victim to a multimillion-dollar-level fraud in Ukraine, and — while that has been acknowledged by the organization — several former staff members told Devex that when they tried to implement better monitoring systems for the Ukrainian response, they faced resistance from WCK leadership. Two former employees told Devex that WCK had little to no system for verifying the meals they’d paid restaurants to deliver. And when spot checks were done on some of those places, one staffer found that no food — or very little food — had been delivered at all. “The reality is that from World Central Kitchen, despite the funding, no one feeds people in Kherson,” concluded an internal investigation into the fraud in Ukraine, which was later obtained by Devex. “Where does the company's money go? Why is this happening? Who is behind all this?” At the same time, WCK’s revenue plummeted from its peak. It dropped from nearly $550 million in revenue in 2022 to $240 million in 2023, according to the organization’s latest financial statement. By the time WCK started its work in Gaza, Alex Poiter, who was the controller of the organization’s finance team from March 2023 to November 2024, told Devex that WCK’s resources were “unbelievably strained.” “My counterpart was leaving, my team was already working long hours, and we were all stretched thin,” said Poiter, who left the organization late last year. “I remember sitting there thinking: Why is no one asking what our capacity is, and why aren’t we saying no to more disasters? At that point, our team was just losing it.” The organization hadn’t had a chief financial officer in two months, as their last left WCK (with a nearly $190,000 severance package) in August 2023. Around the same time, a slew of staff on WCK’s policy team had also been let go. And by last December, WCK had churned through at least five human resources officers in as many years. “That’s why I go back to that October [of 2023], and me basically begging them to say no to another disaster,” Poiter said of the war in Gaza. “When you start to do so many things in so many different directions — and you’re stretched on resources — that is when you’re opening your organization up to fraud. You can't follow the safeguards as closely, and you can't ensure things are being done correctly, when you just can't keep up.” Of course, there was also the organization’s impact, and the fact that the once-scrappy aid agency had delivered millions of meals to those in need. But especially after WCK entered Ukraine, many told Devex the workforce was just pushed too far, too fast. And despite the work WCK was doing, many staff felt the lack of guardrails had begun to catch up. “[José] wants us to be the kind of people that pull off miracles,” said another former contractor. “That is so beautiful and so admirable. But when it’s not reinforced by any good management or organization or realistic expectations, it becomes really toxic really fast.” A ‘break down’ in Gaza It was against that backdrop that the organization entered Gaza — the most dangerous place for aid workers in the world. To date, the IDF has killed more than 50,000 people across the territory, obstructed humanitarian aid, and reduced schools, homes, and hospitals to rubble. That’s according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza, which released new figures on the death toll last month. Humanitarians — especially those who are Palestinian — have not been spared. From the start of the Israel-Hamas war until today, at least 412 humanitarians have been killed by Israeli strikes, 98% of whom were Palestinian, according to the latest figures from the Aid Worker Security Database. Last month, an Israeli strike killed another nine aid workers and journalists, eight of whom were from the United Kingdom-based Al-Khair Foundation; soon after, WCK lost another volunteer when the IDF strikes landed near a kitchen supported by the organization. But the April 2024 attack marked the first time international aid workers were killed in Gaza — and that, along with the weight of the organization’s celebrity leader, changed the tone. U.S. President Joe Biden said he was “outraged and heartbroken” by the deaths. The IDF admitted their “deep sorrow about the incident,” stating they had misidentified the WCK vehicles. And Andrés’ face splashed across mainstream television, with the chef demanding answers about what happened the night of April 1. “Every single civilian life is sacred, and must never be treated as collateral damage,” said Andrés, speaking at a memorial for those who had died a few weeks after the attack. The Australian government, which had lost one of its citizens in the strike, commissioned an investigation. It centered on the deaths of all seven traveling within the WCK convoy, including four WCK staff — its own national Zomi Frankcom, along with Damian Sobol, Jacob Flickinger, and Saifeddin Issam Ayad Abutaha — and three security officers, John Chapman, James Kirby, and James Henderson. The latter three were employed by Solace Global, a company that provided “close personal security” for the WCK team, according to the report. WCK also said Solace Global provided multiday safety and security training to international staff who were deployed to Gaza, though one person familiar with that training described it as an “express” safety course in the organization’s office. And, several staff members told Devex that those security contractors operated more like regular employees, often lacking the power to make real security decisions that would go against the grain of WCK leadership. “My decisions, or the decisions of any other staff member, would trump the outside security people because [the security team] felt like they were reporting to us,” one former employee told Devex, speaking of their experiences in Ukraine. “[The security team was] on the periphery and didn’t know how we operated.” Similar sentiments were echoed by an employee who worked on the Gaza response, who stated that despite the security contractors’ efforts to protect WCK staff on the ground, one of those contractors described feeling “hopeless” because of how fast the organization was moving — especially when it came to WCK’s construction of a pier in North Gaza, which brought the first maritime aid shipment to the territory in over two decades. “They felt like they were not listened to,” the employee added. “The final word is not behind security.” Solace Global declined to comment on this story. All of that being said, the Australia report — which was written by Australian Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin — placed the responsibility for the attack on Israel, the country whose military force not only pulled the trigger, but had known about WCK’s convoy before it set out, mistakenly identified a driver putting a “gun” into a WCK vehicle, and violated its own standard operating procedures, according to findings from the report. But Binskin also noted how the convoy — which was transporting food from WCK’s pier to its warehouse in Deir el-Balah — was traveling at night, making the WCK logos difficult to see, and “adding to the misidentification and misclassification,” according to an Israeli investigation that Binskin reviewed. He also stated that a locally contracted security officer fired his weapon into the air while on top of an associated truck, an action that led the IDF to claim the convoy was being hijacked by Hamas. “Having armed guards on humanitarian aid convoys that are fully coordinated with the IDF is unusual and, in this case, if requested by WCK, would have been denied,” Binskin stated in the report, adding that he could not “rule out” that WCK had “inadvertently contracted security for the aid convoy with an entity that had links to Hamas.” The IDF later mistakenly identified one of the WCK drivers putting a gun into their vehicle, the report stated. Even after the WCK vehicles split off from the locally-contracted security personnel that had fired a weapon — with that car traveling north, and three WCK vehicles driving west toward their accommodations — the IDF continued surveilling the latter convoy, ultimately striking each car. “Acknowledging the significant focus that WCK and Solace Global placed on not carrying weapons and WCK’s previous experience contracting local security, it may never be possible to determine how the locally-contracted security for this aid convoy ended up having armed individuals involved,” he said. “There was a significant break down in situational awareness due to a number of factors — primarily the presence of armed gunmen associated with the WCK aid convoy and a failure within the IDF to fully disseminate and/or read the detailed movement plan approved for the convoy,” Binskin went on. “In this incident, it appears that the IDF controls failed, leading to errors in decision making and a misidentification, likely compounded by a level of confirmation bias.” In a statement to Devex, WCK said that the IDF has “acknowledged its responsibility and its fatal errors in the deadly April 1 attack,” noting that such an acknowledgement was consistent with the conclusion reached by Binskin above. The organization also stated that the WCK operations of April 1 were closely coordinated with the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, or COGAT, the unit of the IDF that oversees humanitarian projects in Gaza and the West Bank, and that it was “widely known within Israel and had a senior IDF commander and COGAT representative present at the jetty during the day.” But for several staff, questions continued to spiral about WCK’s readiness to enter Gaza in the first place. Many brought up the fact that the site of the organization’s pier — which was operational two months before the U.S. government built their own — appears to be seen in a video published by Al Jazeera three days before the April 1 attack. The video shows two Palestinian men waving what appears to be white fabric, a sign of surrender, before they were shot and killed by the IDF. In the frame, there are a series of blue-and-white tents, which seem to match those in the organization’s own footage, though this could not be independently confirmed by Devex. Still, the work continued — and the seven staff members had just completed retrieving food from the pier when they were attacked. “We’re not set up to go into war zones. I’m sorry, but it’s just not what we do,” said a former contractor, who had worked with the organization in Ukraine. “A hurricane in Florida is very different than urban combat with the most lethal army in the world. You can’t do it. It’s just reckless, irresponsible. And we lost really incredible, irreplaceable humans because of that.” Exactly 30 days after the April 1 attack, Andrés wrote an opinion piece in The Washington Post. He said the organization would be returning to Gaza, though they would be doing so “with what is at best a limited understanding of how humanitarian aid workers will be protected in the coming weeks and months.” “It’s a simple decision for us because the need is so great,” Andrés wrote. “We cannot stand by while so many people are so desperate for the essentials of life.” Eight months after the first set of WCK staff were killed, the IDF shot down another one of the organization’s convoys, killing three Palestinian staff — none of whom were ever named publicly by WCK, or mentioned on the “Honoring Our Heroes” page set up after April 1. This time, things were even more complicated. The Israeli military alleged that one of those workers had participated in Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel, which killed 1,200 people, took 250 hostages back to Gaza, and sparked more than a year of ruthless conflict. WCK stated they “had no knowledge that any individual in the vehicle had alleged ties” to the massacre, later adding that they had “no reason for concern regarding any of these individuals and, because Israel does not share intelligence with aid organizations, we do not know the basis for Israel’s decision to flag these individuals.” And a week later, Bloomberg reported that some 60 Gaza-based WCK staff members were fired after failing an Israeli background check. “It just opened up a lot of wounds over the last eight months,” said Phelps. “After not seeing an official response from World Central Kitchen on the findings of the Australia report, you just wonder who was leading these folks. Would robust training and overall experience have mitigated some of the danger?” ‘Enough’ After Watters’ March 2024 email hit the leadership team’s inboxes, WCK’s chief safety and security officer, McLellan, responded to him directly. The organization had provided a hostile environment awareness training, or HEAT course, for staff members deploying to Gaza, McLellan said, referring to the standard training for anyone deploying to high-risk environments. “We have also developed an evacuation plan, trained our staff on the responses required, and built strong relationships with all the actors in the country ensuring that we are well informed of all activity and incidents,” McLellan continued. “In addition, we have our locations in the country deconflicted so that they are protected from Israeli activities.” He also told Watters the organization had built on “lessons learned in Ukraine” and invested significant resources to improve “safety and security response and platforms.” But on March 24 — one week before the April 1 attack — McLellan invited his staff to attend a customized HEAT course. It would take place in Washington, D.C. from May 13 to 17, 2024, and was the first to be hosted by the organization. On March 28, Damian Sobol, who was already based in Gaza, responded. “Thank you for extending the invitation to us and for addressing important issues such as security and crisis management,” wrote Sobol in an email, which was later obtained by Devex. “I appreciate the opportunity to be … part of the event.” Sobol was killed by the Israeli airstrike four days later. And the HEAT course, which gathered WCK staffers to Washington, D.C., was held without him. "There are some changes, and yes, I can say some of these things are true. The HEAT training is one of the biggest things that changed,” an employee who worked on the Gaza response told Devex. “But this problem has been there for a while, and again, this should not be a great thing we’re proud of: that finally, after so many years, we have this training. It’s long overdue.” As of this month, WCK told Devex that more than 130 of the team’s response corps “have gone through or are scheduled to go through” HEAT training, which is providing skills in trauma medicine, communications, checkpoint negotiation, and active shooter protocols, among other knowledge for working in high-risk locations. The organization is also hiring more security personnel, with three related roles posted in Europe and the Middle East, Latin America, and the United States. And for one current contractor, it did feel like efforts were being made — to some extent — to increase staff safety since last April. “There are inherent risks in crisis response work,” expanded WCK in a statement to Devex. “With each activation, we take the safety, security, and well-being of our personnel very seriously, seeking to ensure we have robust, reasonable, and appropriate safety and security measures in place as part of our commitment to mitigate these risks.” There have been other changes, too. As of late last year, WCK was undergoing a restructuring of its relief team, offering several members of its staff severance packages — which were conditional on signing nondisclosure agreements, numerous staff told Devex. WCK declined to comment on personnel changes or staff matters, though the organization is now actively hiring, and there were 18 positions listed on their careers page as of last week. The vast majority of those roles are for relief operations outside the United States. Through it all, the disasters haven’t stopped. Today, WCK is currently responding to crises in not just Gaza, but in Lebanon, Myanmar, Ukraine, the West Bank, and beyond. “[Staff] are just saying yes to whatever is at hand, and then hoping they get through to the next day,” another former staff member said. “But when things get particularly bad or particularly risky — like when people die — you can’t throw money or luck at it. It’s spun off the rails now, and the stakes are too high.” Zomi Frankcom made that clear to Phelps. Before she even got to Gaza, Frankcom had been struggling at WCK, telling Phelps about the lack of support she was receiving from leadership and the culture that permeated its ranks. “I think about quitting multiple times a day,” Frankcom wrote in a WhatsApp message, speaking in December 2023. She’d bought a new book, she told Phelps, and it was called “Quit: The Power of Knowing When to Walk Away.” “Let me know if you hear of anything in 2024. My soul is starting to fray,” she wrote. Three months later, Frankcom went to Gaza anyway. And from the other end of the line, Phelps was terrified for her safety — “not just because of where she was, but who she was working for.” “The people who died on April 1 were the ones who, when leadership said jump, they would be the first to ask how high. They were the most selfless people that always put the organization first,” said a different former staffer. “But there was never any oversight to say: enough.”