USAID warned against building the Gaza pier. It happened anyway

Earlier this year, U.S. President Joe Biden announced a new approach for getting aid into Gaza: a maritime corridor in the Mediterranean Sea. The $230 million project, which was referred to as the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore modular system, or JLOTS, had hoped to feed 1.5 million people over three months. But from its earliest days, staff at the U.S. Agency for International Development were concerned, according to a new report released by USAID’s Office of Inspector General. “Multiple USAID staff expressed concerns that the focus on using JLOTS would detract from the Agency’s advocacy for opening land crossings, which were seen as more efficient and proven methods of transporting aid into Gaza,” stated the investigation, which was published on Tuesday. “However, once the President issued the directive, the Agency’s focus was to use JLOTS as effectively as possible.” JLOTS ultimately moved 20 million pounds of aid into Gaza, USAID told Devex — one of the largest distributions of assistance during the period that the pier was operational. But from start to finish, the project was riddled with challenges. Security issues, access obstacles, and rough weather outside of USAID’s control led to JLOTS’ lifespan being reduced from 90 to 20 days, ultimately feeding 450,000 people out of its hoped-for 1.5 million. “When every single second matters, and it’s a matter of hours — if not minutes — that some individuals can die, then speed and efficiency is of essence,” said Deepmala Mahla, the chief humanitarian officer at CARE. “The pier was neither speedy nor efficient. And this was done despite several warnings, statements, and cries from the humanitarian community.” Mahla is not alone. Before the pier was officially announced, USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, or BHA — the U.S.’ lead coordinator for international disaster response — had advocated for transporting aid through land routes, the OIG report found. For months, such avenues had been choked by near-constant hostilities and inspections by the Israeli government, but USAID and many other international agencies felt pushing for expanded access would result in a more efficient, better-coordinated response. “Multiple BHA staff noted that using JLOTS was not an option USAID would typically recommend in humanitarian response operations,” stated the OIG report, adding that the agency felt pushing for land crossings in Israel and Egypt would have been a more proven approach. But on March 7, Biden made his announcement — and in the week following his address, USAID switched gears. Still, in a statement to Devex, USAID maintained that the maritime humanitarian corridor was “always intended as an additive measure, not a replacement, for land routes.” “USAID’s advocacy, both publicly and privately, for the expansion of all humanitarian land routes into Gaza has remained consistent throughout the conflict,” a USAID spokesperson said. A rocky start USAID teamed up with the U.S. Department of Defense and the World Food Programme — the project’s lead distributing partner — to get the pier project off the ground. It was a multi-agency effort, USAID told Devex, but the report stated the project was forced to “worked within the operational and security requirements set by [the Department of Defense] and the [Israel Defense Forces].” “Despite its role as the U.S. government lead for humanitarian assistance in Gaza, USAID had limited control over the decision to use JLOTS, where it would be located, and who would provide security on the beach and during transportation of JLOTS-delivered aid,” the report stated. “These issues, coupled with high winds and rough seas in the Mediterranean Sea near the Gaza coast, impaired the Agency’s ability to deliver the intended amounts of aid through the maritime corridor.” The project’s lead distributing partner, WFP, was also forced to compromise on JLOTS, the report stated. Despite the WFP’s request to locate the pier in northern Gaza, the Department of Defense wanted to build the pier in the territory’s center, citing security concerns. And although WFP wanted a third-party United Nations member state to provide security for the operation, no third party agreed to the task — and IDF took over the job. “Before its launch, WFP highlighted in its USAID award documentation that lack of community buy-in among Palestinians for the maritime corridor could result in significant safety and security risks and compromise its operations,” the report stated. “Moreover, concerns about the perceived militarization of the pier and Palestinian community views about the neutrality of humanitarian operations further limited the distribution of aid delivered through the JLOTS maritime corridor.” Those concerns came to a head in early June, the OIG report found. Three weeks after the first shipment of humanitarian aid was delivered through JLOTS, IDF conducted an operation to rescue four Israeli hostages taken by Hamas on Oct. 7. Social media posts began to circulate with the JLOTS pier in the background — and though the U.S. Central Command denied the pier played a role in the rescue, WFP paused JLOTS’ operations for nearly three weeks, the report stated. “As a result of the UN’s pause in using JLOTS, thousands of pallets of aid from the JLOTS operation piled up on the Gaza beach. According to USAID staff, DoD sought to deliver the commodities to the beach while the weather permitted, regardless of whether or when WFP could collect the goods for distribution in Gaza,” the report stated. Those goods were shelf-stable canned goods, and not at immediate risk of spoilage. But by the time WFP contractors had the clearance to collect that assistance, 8,860 pallets of aid had piled up on the beach. No alternatives In many ways, the pier was intended to side-step land routes — avenues that had been blocked due to Israeli inspections, warfare, and security concerns. But as soon as the pier became operational, many of the same issues hit JLOTS. The report noted attacks on WFP warehouses, the looting of aid from the beach, and multiple cases of drivers being detained or shot. During the first two days of the maritime corridor’s existence, the report also stated that crowds “improperly removed humanitarian aid” from 12 of the 26 WFP trucks attempting to distribute supplies from the pier to the organization’s warehouse. There was also the issue of weather: During its eight-week existence, the report stated the pier was “frequently rendered inoperable” due to high winds and rough seas. Over time, USAID, the Department of Defense, and IDF were able to develop another solution for redirecting the aid. Though JLOTS delivered just under 750 metric tons of aid to Gaza in May — compared to the 10,513 tons distributed through Gaza’s three land crossings — in July, more aid came through JLOTS than any other avenue. During the pier’s last month of operation, JLOTS transported 4,039 metric tons to Gaza, compared to just 3,359 metric tons coming through all three land crossings. Those improvements were something USAID pointed out in a statement to Devex, too. “USAID teams working in the region and in Washington supported humanitarian partners and governments in the region to coordinate the safe passage of humanitarian aid and commercial goods through all existing land crossings,” a USAID spokesperson said. “In addition to the amount of aid that was able to move into Gaza, the planning and management of pier operations allowed for enhanced multinational cooperation and greater communication between humanitarian partners and Israeli authorities.” Despite that, many in the humanitarian sector feel the pier was — for the most part — a distraction. It’s something Biden acknowledged in a press conference this past July, stating he was “hopeful” that the pier would have been “more successful.” “Of course, there are going to be moments where you think, can we do something else? Is there any other way? But having spent time there, no,” said Mahla, who spoke to Devex just weeks after visiting Gaza herself. “There’s no alternative to a ceasefire and opening land borders if we are truly serious about facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid.” “The energy, conversations, talks, and planning that happened for the pier should have happened for a ceasefire, and for opening land borders,” she added. “That’s where the time, money, and diplomatic conversation should have happened.”