What are the main factions at COP — and what do they want?

Every year, leaders from 197 governments arrive at the United Nations Conference of Parties climate summits, better known as COP, to negotiate for the future of the world. The talks are notoriously complex. Every country in the world is there and required to come to a consensus agreement. As a result, the decision-making is driven by a loose and ever-changing menagerie of factions and groups. Newcomers to COP are greeted by a mouthful of acronyms, each standing for one of the blocs engaged in the negotiations, all with their own objectives. There are more than a dozen, as outlined in the chart below. In this article, Devex will provide a detailed guide to the ones with strong associations to international development, as well as sketching out who’s on the other side of the table. The presidency Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change — the governing treaty that established COPs — the COP president changes each event. This year, Egypt will hand the baton to the United Arab Emirates for COP 28. The presidency’s job is to “get a consensus outcome that pleases everyone — an impossible task,” said a long-term observer of the talks. The person, speaking anonymously to preserve relationships, said the president’s job is to understand the dynamics of the talks, in which “some agendas will be held hostage for others to be resolved,” and to keep them moving forward. Presidencies also have their own priorities that they try to progress during COP, spurred on by thematic days. Initiatives like the first Just Energy Transitions Partnership in South Africa came about during the United Kingdom’s presidency of COP 26. The UAE’s designated representative of the presidency, Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, wrote that he wants a “package” on just transitions, and they are also working on a climate finance initiative for conflict zones, among other proposals. While Egypt, as COP 27 host, is still officially responsible for strategy, a much-awaited plan from the UAE wasn’t well received by climate campaigners. “Everyone is feeling the list is long and confused and doesn’t necessarily set priorities in the way people have hoped for,” said the source. “The sense of UAE is that they are low on strategy, doing lots of listening, but not clear enough in how they are translating into priorities.” G77 plus China COP blocs can overlap, with some countries working in more than one. Within the large Group of 77 plus China group, which is actually made up of more than 130 countries, countries also belong to the Alliance of Small Island States, or AOSIS; Least Developed Countries, or the LDC group; Africa Group of Negotiators, or AGN; Like-Minded Developing Countries, or the LMDC group; and the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean, or ILAC. The myriad of different interests at stake means the hefty G77 plus China group does not always work together. “If these groups can’t agree on a common position then the G77 + China group doesn’t negotiate as one bloc,” Emily Wilkinson, director of the Resilient and Sustainable Islands Initiative at ODI, wrote to Devex. But when G77 plus China does cooperate, big things can happen. “With the COP 27 negotiations on loss and damage finance, for example, it was really important for G77 + China to negotiate together,” said Wilkinson. She added: “When there is a common position, the G77 + China coordinator (for whatever negotiating track) will speak first and other groups will intervene afterwards, aligning themselves with the G77 + China position before adding further clarifications [and] arguments.” Some factions, like the LDC group, receive technical, legal, or diplomatic support from experts in think tanks and NGOs, which can observe the COP negotiations and advise the parties. Least Developed Countries group The Least Developed Countries group is made up of 46 countries describing themselves as “nations which are especially vulnerable to climate change but have done the least to cause the problem.” Since the 2015 Paris Agreement, the group’s position has been “we are not going to be victims, we are going to be leaders on climate and we will speak to what the science requires,” said Clare Shakya, director of climate change at the International Institute for Environment and Development, which supports the LDC group. LDCs may be made up of the lowest-income nations on earth, but their relatively unified stance means they have punched above their weight in negotiations. “The more progressive position has actually been very powerful because when you’ve got … some of these much poorer countries saying they are aiming to achieve net zero. It leaves the richer countries [and] emerging economies with nowhere to go,” said Shakya. In talks, LDCs have pushed hard on climate adaptation — infrastructure, technology, and training that help countries deal with changes that have already happened. Adaptation is generally considered underfunded compared to mitigation, which involves reducing future heat increases, largely by shifting to cleaner energy sources. The group has repeatedly called for more dedicated adaptation finance. The group has pushed hard to achieve the Global Goal on Adaptation, a target agreed upon under the 2015 Paris Agreement to measure the effects of and responses to climate change. It was described as one of the group’s “main priorities” by LDC group chair Madeleine Diouf Sarr, head of the Climate Change Division in Senegal's Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development. Another key priority is funding to address loss and damage incurred due to climate change. A new fund is currently under development to provide this support, and Sarr has called for the fund to be “equipped to quickly deliver new and additional money — as grants — to our vulnerable communities.” Sarr said these communities are increasingly impacted by extreme weather and by slow-onset events such as rising water levels. Securing trillions in climate finance to underwrite the cost of responding to these events, and to transition to clean energy, is another key objective of the LDC group. Sarr said the group was concerned about a new target for climate finance, known as the new qualified collective goal, to replace the $100 billion per year climate finance target, agreed in 2009 to help lower-income countries deal with climate change. Specifically, she expressed concern about climate finance “being reframed” into “a nebulous goal around general global finance flows, which fail to reach or to support the most vulnerable.” Alliance of Small Island States While many small island developing states have graduated from the low-income status that characterizes the LDC group, their size means economic growth prospects are limited and they are highly vulnerable to climate change. Belize has been affected by intense hurricanes; rising and warmer seas that kill coral reefs and erode coastlines; the loss of beaches, houses, and cemeteries; and flooding and the contamination of groundwater, according to Carlos Fuller, the country’s permanent representative to the United Nations. “Environmental issues are our forte” at the U.N., he told Devex. While much of the country is on the Central American mainland, Belize’s islands and low-lying coastline are big tourist destinations — a key part of the economy. The country is a member of the 39-strong Alliance of Small Island States, for which Fuller was chief negotiator on climate change from 2019 to 2020. AOSIS states also work together at the U.N. on oceans and sustainable development issues. On key issues such as adaptation finance and setting up the loss and damage fund, AOSIS is “fully aligned” with the LDC group, according to Fuller. The two groups also share similar campaigning positions on climate mitigation. Fuller repeated similar points to Sarr, LDC chair, on the need for an ambitious global stocktake — a review of how well the world has met the climate change challenge — and agreement on the new qualified collective goal. AOSIS has established strong coordination between states, with technical working groups taking place nearly every day, along with ambassadorial meetings, and a functioning rotating chair, according to Fuller. Coordination with other groups, such as LDCs, happens between chairs prior to COP, with further cooperation at the summit on shared interests, he added. Africa Group of Negotiators The African continent has been negotiating as a bloc, known as the Africa Group of Negotiators, or AGN, since the first COP in 1995. Their “overriding philosophy is anchored on the continent’s vulnerabilities to negative impacts of climate change (being the most adversely impacted region), and yet the least contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions (historic and current) with less than 4% of global emissions,” according to an AGN statement provided to Devex, citing data from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC. The bloc often “collaborates closely” with the G77 plus China and the LDC group, according to the statement. They focus on the need for “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities”. This means AGN’s positions emphasize the need for high-income countries to lead on climate action, helping to reduce emissions and provide finance and other support to low- and middle-income countries to help them achieve their national climate goals. The group’s priorities for COP 28 are getting the loss and damage fund up and running and for a successful global stocktake, or GST, according to the statement. “We have a mammoth task to continue advancing Africa’s interests. … We cannot afford to lose track of the GST,” AGN chair Ephraim Mwepya Shitima said in the statement. Hinting at AGN’s position to continue extracting fossil fuels on the continent, Shitima continued: “Our emerging position … is to ensure an equitable and just global transition to a low emission and climate resilient world that allows African countries the policy space to achieve the SDGs in the immediate to medium-term (2030), using all its natural resources and endowment.” AGN has faced criticism that the group has historically been very influenced by South Africa and Egypt, but a bloc spokesperson rejected this characterization, and said the description of those two countries as high emitters was “far-fetched” because of Africa’s low overall contribution to emissions. “AGN positions are agreed upon based on consensus … We are therefore not aware of any bullying or influence from particular member states regarding the African common position as presented at various climate negotiation fora,” said the statement. Who’s on the other side of the table? So who are these groups dealing with, on the far side of the table? One of the main divisions is between the countries mentioned above, and the countries named in Annex I and Annex II of UNFCCC. Annex II countries include the 24 members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development at the time the convention was agreed, less Turkey, plus the European Union. They are high-income countries that are expected to actively support the rest of the world to deal with the impacts of climate. It was these countries that committed to providing $100 billion in climate finance — a target that was met in 2022, but marked by unclear and poor quality commitments. This group is principally the same as the nations providing official development assistance, who are also expected to fund climate work around the world. Annex I countries include all the countries in Annex II, as well as 19 other countries, including “countries with economies in transition” — namely Russia, Turkey, and a number of eastern European countries. There are 43 countries in Annex I. However, there is also a group of countries outside Annex I such as Singapore and South Korea which have become significantly richer since the treaty was signed, and there is tension between them, and older donors, who feel that this group of nouveaux riches may not always be paying their fair share. Another significant faction is the wealthy oil-producing countries, many of which are also not Annex I countries, but which some see as using their wealth and influence to slow the pace of change — a particular issue given that this year’s COP is being held in the Middle East. These countries are also outside Annex I, for the most part, but are suspected of using their close trade relationships with nearby neighbors to influence the results of talks. Another faction similarly capable of influencing proceedings, although not represented around the table, are the major corporates in the global north that stand to gain or lose a great deal based on the results of negotiations. These corporations, similar to the oil-producing nations, have in the past worked through countries where they have struck lucrative deals. Yet another negotiating faction is a bloc of large emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil, which have recently become major emitters but still predominantly have lower per-capita income than the Annex II countries. These groups are also the major funders and most influential players at the multilateral institutions, and there is a push among them for those institutions to shoulder more of the burden. Within these groups, the dynamics are extremely fluid, in part due to frequent changes in government and therefore in the overall approach. Generally speaking, the European Union, especially its northern members, have pushed more ambitious lines, but have been thwarted by a lack of consensus. The United Kingdom in the past has been an advocate for stronger climate measures but in recent years has backed away. The most influential among the Annex II countries, the United States, is also among those furthest behind on its commitments. Calculations by the think tank ODI found that the U.S. had contributed only $2.3 billion of climate finance — less than 5% of its fair share of the $100 billion climate goal — and while the Inflation Reduction Act has signaled some enthusiasm on the part of the current White House to negotiate on climate, the gridlock in Congress is likely to prevent any meaningful action. Right now, the loose collection of wealthier nations are facing an unusually severe set of domestic challenges at present due to the war in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the concomitant impact of inflation and high interest rates, leaving potentially less room to negotiate than there might be at the average COP. David Ainsworth contributed additional reporting.