Opinion: USAID can maintain its impact amid a transition to DOS

The author, a USAID foreign service officer, was fired on March 28 and, like nearly all agency staff, will leave U.S. government service in the coming months.

In spite of its proud six-decade history delivering impactful, transformational foreign assistance programs around the globe, news dropped Friday that the world’s largest aid agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, is being officially “abolished.” Nearly all staffers have now been fired. Given that the U.S. Department of State will absorb several USAID programs, the best outcome for USAID at this point is for this merger to happen strategically and intentionally to retain America’s soft power globally.

As we prepare to radically reconfigure our foreign assistance machinery, it makes sense to consider the compromises that will be involved once U.S. aid is delivered via DOS. Indeed, while this model would preserve some role for U.S. foreign assistance programs overseas, it will likely also substantively hamper their effectiveness. How do we know? It turns out that many of our friends and partners, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, have tried this in recent years, and their programs have suffered as a result.

Reviewing our partners’ experience can help us prepare for the programmatic tradeoffs we’re about to encounter.

Diplomacy vs. development

Diplomacy and development are fundamentally different tasks, requiring different approaches, skill sets, and staffing patterns. U.S. national security overseas is said to rely upon the three D’s: defense, diplomacy, and development. Development is a critical foundation in establishing this stable three-legged stool. Without each of these approaches, our foreign policy is compromised; our soft power is diminished. As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis famously concluded: “If you don't fully fund the State Department, please buy a little more ammunition for me because I'm going to need it.”

There are several ways DOS and USAID work differently, and as we prepare for this transition, reviewing and addressing these differences proactively will strengthen the future of U.S. development work:

1. There is a time frame disconnect between scoring political gains and achieving long-term development outcomes. Effective development takes time. The U.S. political calendar, with its potential political and/or administration shifts every two to four years, threatens the kind of patient, consistent approach that is the cornerstone of effective development.

2. Local experts play distinct roles in diplomacy compared to development. At embassies around the world, policy decisions are led — quite appropriately — by Americans. Local staff primarily serve in administrative roles. Development is different. USAID’s programs are led by local experts: past and future ministers, doctorates, entrepreneurs, and community leaders. DOS isn’t programmed to support the integration of local leaders into its work adequately for effective development. Once under DOS, leadership opportunities for these local experts will be diminished, and the role of well-meaning, though less prepared, Americans will be expanded to the detriment of programming impact.

3. DOS and USAID mandates are different and thereby require different skills and capacities to succeed. USAID staff spend years in the field building partnerships and fostering trust. DOS tour lengths are shorter, and officers focus on reporting political developments. USAID’s oversight process involves rigorous training for program managers, and officials maintain specialized and unique contracting authorities.

While these real and potential pitfalls are considerable, they are not insurmountable. Luckily, as we prepare to transition U.S. foreign assistance under DOS, we have extensive experience to draw from.

Lessons from our partners: The UK, Canada, and Australia

Twenty years ago, British, Canadian, and Australian development assistance was delivered in a manner similar to ours, by an independent development agency in close coordination with foreign policy authorities. However, in recent years, each of these countries’ development agencies were absorbed into their respective foreign affairs ministries.

As these three nations managed this transition, they each proceeded gradually and thoughtfully. None began with the wholesale gutting of agency staff. As we contemplate making this significant shift, we would do well to review and learn from this experience. Here are some things these countries got right:

1. Ensure a long-term, iterative process: In the U.K., reform was pursued thoughtfully, strategically, and patiently. The process of merging the U.K.’s Department for International Development with the U.K.’s Foreign Office, leading to the creation of the renamed Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, unfolded over three years, culminating in 2023, while many of the ideas and priorities for the merger had been under discussion for a decade or more beforehand. This allowed for considerable real-time fine-tuning. The process drew input from U.K. development practitioners and partners overseas, and it built on the priorities and strategies of a range of political parties. Time allowed for an iterative process to adapt to the reality of governance.

2. Reinvent, don’t merely absorb: When the Canadian International Development Agency was absorbed into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2013, it led to a fundamental reimagining of the role of Canada’s foreign affairs policy and the creation of an entirely new entity: Global Affairs Canada. If USAID is merely absorbed into existing DOS offices and functions, without a thoughtful discussion of how DOS’ operations or strategy would be modified as a result, impact and effectiveness will be diminished.

3. Maintain consistent messaging: When Australia’s Agency for International Development, or AusAID, was merged into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the well-recognized AusAID symbol, a colorful kangaroo hopping resolutely into the future, was preserved. In spite of the demise of AusAID as an organization, to this day, all Australian foreign assistance maintains the consistent AusAID branding. The clasped hands in USAID’s logo — as well as the tagline “from the American people” — have been critical to building support for and recognition of U.S. foreign assistance projects overseas for decades. Maintaining this powerful and recognizable symbol would build upon the goodwill that the USAID brand has built up over the decades.

Delivering effective foreign assistance via a foreign affairs agency is challenging. But with a thoughtful and long-term approach, it will still be possible to deliver results. Sailing into this process with only a fraction of the foresight and strategic thinking our partners deployed means that surely the U.S. is setting itself up for failure.

How US aid must look within DOS

There is hope that much can still be achieved once U.S. foreign assistance is housed within DOS. Here are four key areas to consider for an efficient future for U.S. aid:

1. Don’t diminish overseas presence. As it currently stands, the vast majority of U.S. direct-hire staff have been fired or placed on “administrative leave,” cut off of government systems. In recent communications, U.S. government officials have outlined a plan where some programs would be managed through regional hubs, but the footprint would be “minimal.” Yet, without eyes and ears on the ground, the efficiency and efficacy of any assistance program will be compromised.

2. Don’t gut staff numbers. While the administration has not publicly shared its overall reform plans, many expect fewer than 300 American staff will be maintained under DOS’ development unit. This drastic understaffing will be woefully inadequate for the administration to achieve its goals of eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.

3. Ensure local staff have leadership roles. Within DOS, any foreign assistance program should put local experts and leaders in the driver’s seat. DOS will need to adapt its policies and practices to ensure these local leaders are adequately empowered to achieve results.

4. Don’t enforce a political litmus test for development programs: If we only do development in support of a particular administration’s priorities, we risk a short-term, scattered approach. Effective development takes time. Moreover, if we limit our programs to what our overseas partners request, we’ll lose leverage in taking on important but tricky priorities such as fighting corruption and ensuring open political systems.

As we prepare to administer aid from within DOS, if we hope to continue our impact, we have much to learn from the experience of our friends and partners. But let’s be clear-eyed about what we’re giving up. Despite the patient and strategic approach that the U.K., Canada, and Australia deployed, the impact of their development programming was diminished. At a minimum, ensuring that USAID retains its impact once its programs are merged into DOS will require a thoughtful and analytical approach. Woodchippers and chainsaws are poorly suited to the task.